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1Premiums, Discounts and Feedback Trading: 
Evidence from Emerging Markets’ ETFs
Abstract 
This study investigates the extent to which ETFs’ premiums and discounts motivate
feedback trading in emerging markets’ ETFs. Using a sample of the first-ever 
launched broad-index ETFs from four emerging markets (Brazil, India, South Africa 
and South Korea), we produce evidence denoting that feedback trading grows in 
significance in the presence of lagged premiums. The significance of feedback 
trading becomes more widespread across our sample’s ETFs as the lagged 
premiums grow in magnitude, with evidence also suggesting that the effect of lagged 
premiums over feedback trading varies prior to and after the outbreak of the recent 
global financial crisis.  
Keywords: feedback trading; exchange-traded funds; emerging markets
JEL classification: G02, G10, G15, G23
2Introduction 
Research on the behaviour of investors in exchange-traded funds (ETFs, hereafter) 
has indicated that they are prone to pursuing feedback strategies, the latter having 
been linked to a variety of behavioural factors including overreaction (Madura and 
Richie, 2004), market sentiment (Chau et al, 2011) and herding (Chen et al, 2012). It 
is worth noting however, that the previous studies have focused on the US market 
and that little is known about investors’ behaviour in emerging market ETFs. Another
interesting issue here is whether ETFs’ premiums/discounts (i.e. the observed 
deviations of ETF-prices from their underlying net asset values – NAV, hereafter) 
also bear an effect over the observed feedback trading in ETFs and whether this 
effect changes following the onset of the recent financial crisis. It is the above issues 
that our study aims at investigating.
To begin with, ETFs have evolved phenomenally as an innovation in international 
equity markets since the 1990s1, with the global ETF-industry totalling 8,143 funds 
and a combined market value of almost $12 trillion by year-end 20132. The key 
feature of ETFs is that they combine elements of both open- and closed-end funds; 
they are both capable of tracking a benchmark-index (like open-end funds) as well 
as being traded in equity markets (like closed-end funds), thus allowing their 
investors the opportunity to trade an index3 through a single tradable instrument. 
Aside from their trading in the secondary market, there also exists a primary market
for them, whereby authorized participants (such as institutional investors or market 
makers) can perform in-kind creation or redemption of ETF-units4; furthermore, ETFs 
allow investors to engage in equity trading practices, including short-selling, margin 
trading and stop-loss orders. Owing to their unique features (including tax-efficiency, 
low management fees, dividend-treatment, transparency and risk-diversification; see 
                                                            
1 The first ETF was launched in Canada under the name TIPs (Toronto Index Participation units) in 1989 with the 
purpose of tracking the Toronto 35 Index. However, it was in the US that ETFs gained in popularity through the 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) which initially dominated their listings in the 1990s. The first ETF was 
launched in the US in 1993 with the purpose of tracking the S&P 500 index and came to be known as “Spiders” 
(SPDRs: Standard & Poor’s 500 Depositary Receipts; ticker symbol SPY).
2 Source: World Federation of Exchanges (2013).
3 The benchmark-index may relate to equities, bonds, currencies, commodities, or sectors, among others.  
4 Unit-creation involves creating ETF-shares by borrowing batches of shares (normally from investment trusts), 
deposit them with the ETF’s management company (alongside an amount of cash) and obtain ETF-shares; unit-
redemption involves authorized participants returning their in-kind created ETF-units and receiving the deposited 
batch of stocks (plus a cash-amount). The cash-amount mentioned here is necessary to cover any discrepancy 
between the ETF’s NAV and the value of the basket of stocks necessary to form an ETF-unit. Cherry (2004) has 
estimated that a range of 25,000 to 600,000 shares are needed to be deposited by authorized participants to 
obtain a single creation-unit in an ETF in the US.
3Deville, 2008 for a detailed discussion), ETFs have traditionally enjoyed wide 
popularity with the institutional investment community as portfolio- and risk-
management instruments (Ünal, 2009; Hill and Teller, 2010) and have been 
attracting increasing numbers of retail investors as an alternative to mutual funds 
(Ellis, 2009; Nedeljikovic, 2011; Flood, 2012).
The popularity of ETFs has motivated research on investors’ behaviour in this 
segment; although this area of research is still in its early stages, evidence suggests
ETFs are particularly susceptible to feedback trading. Feedback trading per se
relates to investment strategies based on historical prices (De Long et al, 1990), 
including momentum trading (Jegadeesh and Titman, 2001), contrarian trading (De 
Bondt and Thaler, 1985), technical analysis (Lo et al, 2000), stop-loss orders (Osler, 
2005), portfolio insurance (Luskin, 1988) and margin trading (Watanabe, 2002; 
Hirose et al, 2009). In the context of ETFs, Madura and Richie (2004) showed that 
US ETFs during the dot com bubble were prone to intraday price-overreaction and -
correction that could be profitably exploited by contrarian (negative feedback5) day-
traders. Chau et al (2011) reported evidence showing that positive feedback trading6
in the three largest US ETFs (Spiders; Cubes7; Diamonds8) grew in significance 
during periods characterized by optimistic market sentiment and up-market trends. 
Chen et al (2012) explored the trading patterns of institutional investors in the US 
ETF market and documented the presence of contrarian trading tendencies among 
them, alongside significant herding, the latter being mainly observed for ETFs of 
smaller size. The reasons why ETF-investors are susceptible to feedback trading 
vary, depending on the type of investor involved. Several feedback-style strategies, 
such as portfolio insurance, margin trading and stop-loss orders are typically 
performed by institutional investors using ETFs (Ünal, 2009) for purposes, such as 
hedging (to protect against declines in the ETF’s underlying index; see Curcio et al, 
2004), tactical portfolio allocation (to gain instant asset-class exposure or shift 
between asset-classes) and core-satellite strategies9. Regarding retail investors, the 
                                                            
5 Negative feedback (or “contrarian”, as is more popularly known) trading involves investors buying (selling) when 
prices fall (rise), i.e. bucking the trend. 
6 Positive feedback (popularly known as “momentum”) trading is the case whereby investors trend-chase by 
buying (selling) when prices rise (fall). 
7 The ETF linked to the NASDAQ100 index, launched in March 1999 (ticker symbol: QQQQ). 
8 The ETF linked to the Dow Jones Industrial Average index, launched in January 1998 (ticker symbol: DIA).
9 A core-satellite strategy combines passive investment instruments (the “core”, which may include benchmarked 
assets, such as ETFs, index futures etc) with a portfolio of individual assets (the “satellite”, including selected 
4very design of ETFs can appeal to a series of behavioural forces (recognition 
heuristic; familiarity bias; ambiguity aversion; limited attention) which can lead them 
to feedback trade by boosting their overconfidence10. Motivated by the forgoing 
discussion, we formally present the first hypothesis of this paper: 
Hypothesis 1: There exists significant feedback trading in emerging markets’ ETFs.     
Another factor capable of giving rise to feedback-style strategies in ETFs is their 
observed premiums and discounts, reflected through the deviations between their 
price and their NAV. Since the value of the assets an ETF invests into comprises its 
fundamental value, the law of one price would suggest that for its pricing to be 
efficient, its price should largely be in line with its NAV; should deviations between 
the two exist, this would indicate the presence of an inefficiency largely similar to the 
closed-end fund puzzle (see e.g. Lee et al, 1991), where closed-end funds have 
been found to be trading at a discount relative to their NAV. Although Deville (2008) 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
stocks, bonds etc); the purpose of such a strategy is to build a portfolio (the “core-satellite” one) with desired risk-
return features.
10 The recognition heuristic (Boyd, 2001) posits that investors evaluate more positively assets that are easier 
for them to recognize compared to others which are not. An ETF, for example, linked to the S&P500 index (such 
as the SPDR mentioned in an earlier footnote) would, on average, be more “recognizable” to retail traders
compared to a fund investing in any particular combination of S&P500-constituents (it is unlikely an investor can 
recognize all 500 names of the constituents of that index). However, if an asset is easier to recognize, it also 
generates a greater sense of familiarity. If the average US retail investor cannot recognize all 500 S&P500-
constituents, it is doubtful he feels familiar with all of them either. What is more, it is highly unlikely that each and 
every one of these 500 stocks will receive equal daily coverage on the news; conversely, the S&P500-values 
would be reported on the news on a daily basis. Consequently, an S&P500-linked ETF would emit an enhanced 
sense of familiarity (Huberman, 2001) to retail investors, since it would invest not just in any basket (whose 
selection-criteria may be based on a strategy the investor may not fully comprehend) but in the specific basket of 
the market’s main index. Another issue here is that the concept of portfolio-diversification entails ambiguity for 
retail investors who are less sophisticated, possess less investment experience and have fewer resources at their 
disposal than their institutional counterparts and this is reflected in the under-diversification often characterizing 
their portfolios (Barberis and Huang, 2001). An ETF can help remove this ambiguity by allowing them instant 
exposure to the portfolio of a sector or the market as a whole. What is more, an ETF removes the ambiguity in 
terms of performance, since it is bound, by design, to track the performance of its underlying index. 
Consequently, an investor who does not feel particular confidence in his portfolio-building skills and wishes to 
invest in a particular market or sector would view investing in an ETF linked to that market/sector more favourably
as a means of ambiguity aversion. Following on from that, limited attention (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003; 
Hirshleifer et al, 2011) - which refers to the situation where individuals’ attention is unable for some reason to 
capture all elements of a multifaceted issue – is relevant here. An investor holding a portfolio trying to replicate 
the performance of a market’s index will have to regularly monitor the performance of his stocks, compare it to 
some pre-determined point in the past and rebalance his portfolio according to each stock’s performance and the 
performance of the index itself. Conversely, holding an ETF linked to that index reduces the above procedure to 
the comparison of the index versus a single asset – the ETF. If ETFs enhance familiarity and simplification in the 
trading process, one would expect retail ETF-investors’ overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 2000; Barber et al, 
2008; Barber et al, 2009) to be boosted, as they would underestimate the probability of realizing losses
(something further encouraged by the fact that less trading costs will be incurred when trading the ETF alone 
rather than the constituents of its underlying index) and render them more susceptible to trend-chasing.  
5has argued that the in-unit creation/redemption would be expected to deter such 
deviations by allowing institutional investors to arbitrage the price discrepancy away, 
evidence on this issue is rather mixed, with some studies advocating ETFs’ pricing 
efficiency (Ackert and Tian, 2000; Elton et al, 2002; Curcio et al, 2004) and others
documenting the presence of significant deviations (Simon and Sternberg, 2004; 
Fujiwara, 2006; Harper et al, 2006; Kayali, 2007; Rompotis, 2010; Shin and 
Soydemir, 2010; Blitz and Huij, 2012). Similar to closed-end funds 11 , research 
(Cherry, 2004; Jares and Lavin, 2004) has confirmed that premiums and discounts in 
ETFs can be profitably exploited by ad hoc trading strategies. Given that these 
strategies are essentially feedback-style in nature (they aim at timing investment in 
an ETF by observing the deviations of its price from its NAV over time), it would be 
reasonable to assume that such deviations can motivate feedback trading in ETFs.
This leads us to the second hypothesis of this paper:   
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relation between the significance of feedback 
trading and premiums/discounts in emerging markets’ ETFs.
Finally, we also examine whether there exists significant time-variation in the impact 
of premiums/discounts on feedback trading in emerging markets’ ETFs. Intuitively,
following the onset of a financial crisis, any price deviation tends to be rather 
persistent as the inefficiency is less likely (or more difficult) to be arbitraged away in 
adverse market conditions. Such a scenario can then push prices further away from 
fundamentals and possibly exacerbate investors’ irrationality. Therefore, one can 
expect the effect of ETFs’ premiums/discounts on feedback trading to be more 
pronounced during crisis periods12. This leads us to our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The effect of ETF premiums/discounts on feedback trading is most 
evident in the periods following the outbreak of a financial crisis.
                                                            
11 See e.g. Hughen et al (2005).
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This expectation is also supported by the empirical evidence of Bohl et al (2014) who documented that the 
short-selling restrictions imposed during the recent global financial crisis has increased the uncertainty among 
stock market investors and induced the adverse herding in stock markets.
6The central goal of the current paper is to test the hypotheses developed above by 
using a sample of the first-ever launched broad-index ETFs from four emerging 
markets (Brazil, India, South Africa and South Korea). Our focus on emerging 
markets was driven by four reasons. First of all, the study of ETF investors’ 
behaviour in general and feedback trading in particular has been confined to date in 
US ETFs, with no evidence being available on other markets. Secondly, investors in 
emerging markets are likely to be attracted to feedback trading strategies when 
investing in ETFs given that they have been found to be more susceptible to 
behavioural patterns13 in their equity-trading compared to their peers in developed 
markets. Thirdly, stocks in emerging markets are more likely to face issues of stale 
pricing (due to their relatively lower volumes and higher trading costs) compared to 
developed markets, thus rendering premiums and discounts more likely in ETFs as a 
result of a) delays in the in-kind creation/redemption of ETF units14 and b) their NAV
not being able always to include all information reflected in ETFs’ closing prices15.
Fourthly, the first-ever launched broad-index ETFs of these specific four markets 
were chosen also because they were among the very first ETFs ever to have been 
launched in emerging markets in general. 
More specifically, our research seeks to address the following questions:
- Is feedback trading significant in emerging markets’ ETFs?
- Do the observed premiums/discounts exert an effect over feedback trading in 
emerging markets’ ETFs?
- Does this effect exhibit differences between pre- and post-crisis periods?  
In summary, our results indicate that, estimated unconditionally, there exists no 
significant feedback trading in our sample ETFs. However, when conditioning 
feedback trading upon the observed lagged premiums/discounts, it exhibits
significance in the presence of lagged premiums (i.e. when the ETF traded at a price 
                                                            
13 For example, Chang et al (2000) showed that emerging markets are more prone to herding than developed 
ones. 
14 If some stocks among the constituents of an index exhibit thinness in their trading, an authorized participant 
might have issues in trading the underlying basket of stocks of that index in order to create/redeem ETF-units. 
15 If the stocks making up an index-basket do not see their prices change as frequently as the index, then at any 
point in time the NAV of the ETF benchmarked to that index will include past valuations for some stocks (e.g. a 
stock that last traded a week ago will see its market value unchanged for a week and that same market value will 
be used in the calculation of the ETF’s NAV every day for the past week). Whereas the ETF’s closing prices will 
change every day to incorporate investors’ beliefs that reflect new information, its NAV will (to the extent that 
some of the underlying basket’s stocks will not trade every day) not be able to do so, since part of its calculation 
will rest on stock-valuations of previous days.  
7in excess of its NAV the day before). This significance becomes more widespread 
among ETFs as the observed lagged premium grows in magnitude, yet appears 
sensitive to the period chosen; the bulk of feedback trading significance is detected 
following the global financial crisis’ outbreak for the South Korean ETF and prior to 
its outbreak for the other three ETFs. Our research produces the following two 
contributions to the extant literature on ETFs. First of all, unlike previous studies 
(Madura and Richie, 2004; Chau et al, 2011; Chen et al, 2012) focusing on US 
ETFs, it investigates for the first time feedback trading in emerging markets’ ETFs, 
thus yielding novel insight in ETF-investors’ behaviour for a market-category
considered to be more susceptible to behaviourally biased trading than developed 
markets. Secondly, it depicts for the first time the effect of ETFs’ premiums/discounts
over the significance of their feedback trading, showing that feedback trading in 
ETFs entails complex dynamics and should not be viewed as a behavioural pattern 
simply based on past returns. The rest of our study is organized as follows: the next 
section provides a detailed presentation of the empirical design and the data
employed; we then present and discuss the results and provide our concluding 
remarks.
Data and Methodology
Our sample data includes daily observations on the closing prices, the net asset 
values and the percentage price deviations from the net asset value16 for the first-
ever launched broad-index ETFs of four emerging markets, namely Brazil (PIBB 
IBRX-50 index fund), India (NIFTY BEES), South Africa (SATRIX 40) and South 
Korea (KOSEF 200). All data for the four ETFs were obtained from their respective 
asset management companies17 and are expressed in the currency of each ETF’s 
home-country; the start-date for each ETF is its launch-date (PIBB IBRX-50 index 
fund: 26/7/2004; NIFTY BEES: 8/1/2002; SATRIX 40: 30/11/2000; KOSEF 200: 
14/10/2002) while the end-date is 7/12/2012.
                                                            
16 For robustness, we have also run our estimations with these deviations calculated as the logarithm of the 
ETF’s closing price minus the logarithm of its NAV; results are essentially identical irrespective of the 
specification used.  
17 The asset management companies involved are Banco Itaú (PIBB IBRX-50 index fund), Goldman Sachs 
Mutual Fund (NIFTY BEES), Satrix Managers (Pty) Ltd. (SATRIX 40) and Woori Asset Management Company 
Ltd. (KOSEF200).
8Descriptive statistics for the daily log-differenced returns of our sample ETF-series 
are presented in table 1 (panel A), from where it is evident that our ETF return-series 
exhibit departures from normality; this is initially denoted by the fact that all four of 
them are found to be significantly (1 percent level) leptokurtic. The Brazilian, Indian 
and South Korean ETFs are also characterized by significant (1 percent level) 
negative skewness, while the significant (1 percent level) Jarque-Bera test statistics 
further confirm the absence of normality in the distributions of all four return-series. 
The documented non-normality could be the product of temporal dependencies in 
the first-moment of the series; the Ljung-Box test-statistics are significant for all ETF 
series 18 , suggesting that such dependencies do exist (possibly due to market 
frictions, such as non-synchronous trading). It is, however, possible that the 
presence of significant feedback trading can lead to autocorrelations of higher order; 
to that end, we implement the Ljung-Box test on squared ETF returns. Results from 
this test exhibit significance (1 percent level) and are significantly higher than the 
Ljung-Box statistics calculated for ETF returns, confirming the presence of higher 
moment temporal dependencies in our ETFs’ distributions.
Panel B presents the summary statistics on the distribution of positive (premiums) 
and negative (discounts) percentage price deviations of the ETFs from their net 
asset values, while panel C provides statistics on the distribution of the day-to-day 
changes in those deviations. It is interesting to note that our sample ETFs trade at a 
discount in the majority of their trading days (85% for the Brazilian ETF; 59% for the 
Indian ETF; 61% for the South African ETF; 74% for the South Korean ETF), and
very often these discounts are in excess of 0.5%. This is largely consistent with 
evidence of ETF premiums/discounts observed for those ETFs being traded outside 
the U.S. market. For example, Jares and Lavin (2004) find frequent and sizable 
premiums/discounts for the ETFs in Japan and Hong Kong, representing profitable 
trading opportunities19. Thus, as discussed in the introduction, it is interesting and 
informative to investigate whether the ETF-investors’ trading behaviour is related to 
                                                            
18 At the 1 percent level, with the exception of the Ljung-Box test statistic for the South Korean ETF which is 
significant at the 10 percent level. 
19 While it is beyond the scope of this paper, it will be interesting in future work to understand better the reasons 
why the mispricing (or price discrepancy) may arise and persist in the ETF markets. A number of sources (e.g., 
dividend, illiquidity, size, and measurement error) have been put forward in explaining the frequent and sizable 
deviations between ETF prices and their NAVs, but there is a lack of consensus in the extant literature. See, e.g., 
Jares and Lavin (2004), Engle and Sarkar (2006), and Shin and Soydemir (2010).       
9the ETFs’ premiums and discounts, and whether this relation varies across the pre-
and post-crisis periods.      
Our empirical design is based on the framework proposed by Sentana and 
Wadhwani (1992), according to which there exist two types of traders, rational 
speculators and feedback traders. Rational speculators aim at maximizing their 
expected mean-variance utility in the following demand function:
Qt =  E౪−1(r౪)ିαθσ౪2                                                                                                            (1)
where tQ reflects the fraction of the ETF’s shares demanded by them,  tt rE 1 is the 
expectation of the ETF’s return for period t given the information at period t-1, is 
the risk-free rate of return,  is the coefficient of risk-aversion and 2t is the 
conditional variance at period t.
Feedback traders’ demand is based on the historical price-sequence and their 
demand function is given as:
௧ܻ = ߛ ݎ௧ିଵ                                                                                                                 (2)
Equation (2) indicates that feedback traders condition their trading on the previous 
period’s return ( 1tr ). In particular, positive feedback traders buy after a price rise and 
sell after a price fall (>0), while negative feedback traders buy when the price is low 
and sell when the price is high (<0) which is consistent with the behaviour of those 
investors following ‘buy low/sell high’ strategies. In equilibrium, the coexistence of 
rational speculators and feedback traders implies that all shares must be held:
tQ + tY = 1 (3)
 tt rE 1 = - 1tr  2t +  2t (4)
Assuming the rational expectation [ tr   =  tt rE 1   + t ] and replacing the conditional 
expected return with the realized return and a stochastic error term, equation (4) can 
be rewritten as:
tr   = – 1tr  2t +  2t + t    (5)



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Equation (5) denotes that the first-order autocorrelation of returns varies with risk in 
the market, 2t   (as indicated by the term 1tr  2t ), while its sign depends on the 
prevailing sign of feedback trading,  (positive feedback trading leads to negative 
return autocorrelation, and vice versa). An issue arises, however, with the extent to 
which the autocorrelation observed is due to feedback traders or extant market 
frictions, caused by for example non-synchronous and thin trading. To that end, 
Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) proposed the following specification of equation (5):
  ttttt rr   12102                                                                            (6)
In the above equation, the effect of market frictions is captured through 
0 , while 1
captures the presence of feedback trading. Since 
1 = -  , this suggests that if 1 is 
positive (negative) and statistically significant, negative (positive) feedback traders 
are dominant in the market.
To examine the influence of premiums/discounts on feedback trading behaviour in 
our sample ETFs (i.e., Hypothesis 2), we extend the empirical version of the Sentana 
and Wadhwani (1992) model proposed by Chau et al. (2011) to allow the demand of 
feedback traders to be affected by the observed premiums/discounts as follows:
௧ܻ = [ߛܦ௧ + ߣ(ͳ െ ܦ௧)]ݎ௧ିଵ                                                                                         (7)        
In equation (7), ܦ௧ is a dummy variable whose value equals one if a given 
premium/discount occurred in period t-1 and zero otherwise20. Equation (7) assumes 
that feedback trading in this case varies with the observed premium/discount, thus 
indicating that the previous period’s ETF’s price and its deviation from its net asset 
value at that period are used interactively by feedback traders. If equation (7) holds, 
equation (5) will become:
tr   = +  2t – [ rtttt DD 12)]1(   + t (8)
Equation (6) can now be modified as follows:
   
ttttttttt rrr DD    121.11,0120.10,02 )1(                                   (9)
                                                            
20 The reason for using the lagged premiums/discounts is that it is unlikely that contemporaneous ETFs’ 
premiums/discounts affect feedback traders’ demand; given that the daily ETF net asset values are reported 
following the end of each trading session, it would be impossible to trade on this information on the same day. 

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To empirically estimate equation (9), we define the conditional variance as an 
asymmetric GARCH process (Glosten et al, 1993):
2
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2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S                                                                          (10)
In the above equation, δ captures the asymmetric responses of volatility following
positive versus negative shocks. St-1 is a binary variable, taking the value of one if 
the shock at time t-1 is negative and zero otherwise; a significantly positive value for
δ indicates that negative shocks increase volatility more than positive ones.
Our sample window includes the period following the outbreak of the recent global
financial crisis; given the importance of this event for global markets, it is necessary 
to examine its effect over our results. To empirically test our conjecture (i.e., 
Hypothesis 3) that the effect of ETF premiums/discounts on feedback trading is most 
evident in the periods following the outbreak of a financial crisis, we split our sample 
window into a pre (up to August 31st, 2008) and a post (September 1st, 200821 –
December 7th, 2012) crisis-outbreak period and repeat our estimation of equations 
(9) and (10). 
Results and Discussion
Table 2 presents the estimation results for equations (6) and (10), i.e. the original 
Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) model. As the estimates from the conditional mean 
equation suggest, none of the four ETFs accommodated significant feedback trading 
during our sample period (
1 is found to be insignificant for all of them), while they 
also appear to be unaffected by the presence of market frictions (the sole evidence 
of significant 
0 is reported for the Brazilian ETF for the 10 percent level of 
significance). These results appear to reject Hypothesis 1. They are also in contrast 
with the evidence of Chau et al (2011) who concluded that there was significant 
feedback trading in the three largest ETFs (Spiders; Cubes; Diamonds) in the U.S.
The differences in the results for the U.S and emerging ETF markets allow us to 
argue that ETF-investors in emerging markets may not exhibit the same behavioural 
                                                            
21 The identification of the crisis-outbreak with September 2008 is motivated by the confluence of events during 
that month in the US (including Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy and the federal government taking over 
Freddie Mac and Fannie May) that led the crisis to turn global. See Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010). 
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pattern in their equity-trading as their peers in the developed markets, maybe 
because of the dissimilarities in their contract design and market microstructure22.
Regarding the conditional variance, it is found to be significantly persistent and 
asymmetric (λ and δ are significantly positive at the 1 percent level for all ETFs). The 
significant persistence of volatility is further illustrated by the values of volatility half-
life calculated as HL=ln(0.5)/ln(β+λ+δ/2) (see Harris and Pisedtasalasai, 2006); as 
these values indicate, the effect of a shock upon each of these ETFs’ volatility lasts 
anywhere between 17 and 30 days. Regarding volatility asymmetry, its presence is 
confirmed for all four ETFs by calculating their asymmetric ratios, all of which 
generate values above unity23. The β coefficient appears significant for the Indian 
and South Korean ETFs indicating that news has a significant impact on their price-
volatility; this is not found to be the case with the Brazilian and South African ETFs.
Taken together, the coefficients describing the conditional variance process, , , , 
and  are not unusual, and are largely in line with the results of Antoniou et al (2005) 
documented for the stock index futures and Chau et al (2011) for the US ETFs.  
We now turn to the focus of this paper and consider the effect of observed 
premiums/discounts over the estimated feedback trading (i.e., Hypothesis 2). To that 
end, we use the daily percentage price deviations of each ETF from its net asset 
value to define the dummy variable in equation (9); we begin by setting Dt = 1 when 
the ETF traded at a discount during the previous day (and zero if it traded at a 
premium) 24 and present results in table 3. Rejecting Hypothesis 2, our results 
indicate the absence of a significant relation between feedback trading and ETFs’ 
lagged premiums/discounts for three of our four ETFs. The only exception is the 
South Korean ETF, whose 
1,1 coefficient appears significantly (5 percent level) 
negative, indicating the presence of significant positive feedback trading when the 
ETF exhibits a lagged premium. No evidence of significant first-order autocorrelation 
is detected, with 
0,0 and 1,0 being both insignificant for all ETFs. When we formally 
test for the hypotheses 
0,0 = 1,0 and 0,1 = 1,1 , we find that neither is rejected for our 
four ETFs. All estimates of the conditional variance equation are in line with the 
                                                            
22 A further examination of why such differences might exist is worthy of a study, but is beyond the scope of this 
paper. We thank the anonymous reviewer for the suggestion.  
23 The asymmetric ratio is calculated here as (β+δ)/ β (see Antoniou et al, 2005).
24 The reason why we set the dummy variable equal to one for discounts is that our sample ETFs trade at a 
discount for the majority of trading days (see table 1).
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results from table 2, implying the presence of highly persistent and asymmetric 
volatility.
The above estimations aimed at assessing the impact of the sign of ETFs’ lagged 
tracking error (i.e. whether an ETF exhibits a lagged premium or discount) over 
feedback trading, yet do not take into account the magnitude of this error. To 
address this issue, we first condition feedback trading upon the observed level of the 
lagged premium/discount, setting Dt equal to one for several premium (percentage 
price deviations ≥ 0.25%, 0.5%, 0.75% and 1%) and discount (percentage price 
deviations ≤ -0.25%, -0.5%, -0.75% and -1%) levels. Results are presented in table 
4; for brevity, only the estimates of 
0,1 and 1,1 are reported. As the table indicates, 
evidence of significant feedback trading arises for the Indian and South Korean ETFs
for various lagged premium levels. More specifically, 
0,1 is positive and significant (5 
percent level) for the Indian ETF when its lagged percentage price deviation is ≥
0.75% and ≥ 1%, suggesting there exists significant negative feedback trading in that 
ETF when it exhibits a lagged premium well above its sample period’s average 
premium (0.42%), although the hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 cannot be rejected. Regarding 
the South Korean ETF, it furnishes us with evidence of significant positive feedback 
trading when its lagged percentage price deviation is ≥ 0.25% and significant 
negative feedback trading when its lagged percentage price deviation is ≥ 0.5% and 
≥ 1%. Combined with the results reported in table 3, these estimates suggest that 
the presence of lagged premiums in this ETF triggers significant feedback trading, 
which switches from positive to negative as the magnitude of the lagged premium 
rises. The hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 is rejected for all cases where the South Korean ETF 
exhibits significant feedback trading. Interpreted within the context of an asset pricing 
model with heterogeneous market participants, these parameter values reveal an 
interesting result, namely that positive feedback trading is higher in the presence of 
significant premiums (tracking error), but negative feedback trading dominates as the 
level of premium rises above certain thresholds. This is consistent with the view that 
some arbitrageurs (negative feedback traders) tend to ‘jump on the bandwagon’ 
themselves before eventually selling out near the top and take their profit, leading to 
the short-term momentum and long-term reversal phenomenon (Antoniou et al. 
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2005). Although eventually arbitrageurs sell out and help prices return to 
fundamentals, in the short run they feed the ‘bubble’ rather than help it to dissolve.       
When we perform separate estimations for the periods before and after the global 
financial crisis’ outbreak, we document evidence of feedback trading significance for 
all four ETFs, with this significance being clustered post crisis-outbreak for the South 
Korean ETF (consistent with Hypothesis 3) and pre crisis-outbreak for the rest three 
ETFs, as table 5 indicates. Starting with the South Korean ETF, 
1,1 is significantly 
negative for the test whereby Dt = 1 when the ETF traded at a discount during the 
previous day (and zero if it traded at a premium) post crisis’ outbreak, indicating that 
during that period, it exhibited significant positive feedback trading when there was a 
lagged premium (although the hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 cannot be rejected). The 0,1
coefficient is consistently positive and significant for all tests involving a positive 
lagged percentage price deviation (≥ 0.25%, 0.5%, 0.75% and 1%) during the same 
period, suggesting that as the lagged premium rises in magnitude, this ETF starts 
exhibiting significant negative feedback trading25. Interestingly, this ETF exhibits 
significant negative feedback trading also when its lagged percentage price deviation 
is ≤-1% during the same period, furnishing us with the initial evidence of feedback 
trading significance in relation to observed lagged discounts. Regarding the period 
prior to the outbreak of the crisis, the Indian ETF exhibits significant negative 
feedback trading (
0,1 >0) for several lagged premium levels (≥0.5%, 0.75% and 1%), 
while the Brazilian ETF presents us with significant negative feedback trading when 
its lagged premium is ≥1%; the hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 is rejected in all these cases. The 
South African ETF also exhibits significant positive feedback trading in the pre crisis’ 
outbreak period when its lagged premium is ≥0.75% and 1%, although the 
hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 cannot be rejected in this case. These differences between 
whole- and sub-sample (and between pre- and post- crisis periods) allow us to 
suggest that relying on the data for the entire period may underestimate the actual 
extent of feedback trading in the emerging markets ETFs. The need for analysis of 
an appropriate subsample is highlighted if reliable policy conclusions are to be 
reached.
                                                            
25 The hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 is rejected for all cases, except for the one with the lagged percentage price deviation 
≥ 0.25%.
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In further analysis, we examine the impact of the magnitude of the lagged 
premium/discount over feedback trading by assuming the change of the percentage 
price deviation (calculated as the first difference between the deviations on day t and 
t-1) and setting Dt equal to one for several such differences (>0; ≥ +0.5%, +1%, +2%; 
≤ -0.5%, -1%, -2%). Results reported in table 6 include - again for brevity - only the 
estimates of 
0,1 and 1,1 and denote the presence of significant feedback trading 
only for the South Korean ETF for various positive changes in its lagged percentage 
price deviation (i.e. for cases related to either an increase in the lagged premium or a 
decrease in the lagged discount). This is the case when the change in the lagged 
percentage price deviation is >0 (significant positive feedback trading), ≥ +0.5% 
(significant positive feedback trading) and ≥ +2% (significant negative feedback 
trading), with the hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 being rejected in the latter case only. 
We then perform our estimations again separately before and after the crisis’ 
outbreak and notice (see table 7) the presence of significant feedback trading for 
various changes in the lagged percentage price deviation for the Indian and South 
Korean ETFs for the period following the crisis’ outbreak only. More specifically, the 
Indian ETF exhibits significant positive (negative) feedback trading for changes in the 
lagged percentage price deviation ≤ -2% (≥ +2%), with the hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 being 
rejected in both cases post crisis’ outbreak. The South Korean ETF exhibits 
significant positive feedback trading during the same period for changes in the 
lagged percentage price deviation >0 (the hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 is not rejected for this 
case) and ≥ +0.5% and significant negative feedback trading for changes in the 
lagged percentage price deviation ≥ +2% (the hypothesis 
0,1 = 1,1 is rejected for both 
cases).
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, the results reported in tables 3-7 denote that feedback 
trading significance is linked to the presence of lagged premiums in our sample 
ETFs. This is particularly apparent for the South Korean ETF, which has significant 
feedback trading across various lagged premium levels, both for the full sample 
period and post crisis’ outbreak, with the sign of this feedback trading switching from 
positive to negative as the size of the premium increases. Taking into account that 
this ETF generated a premium for 660 out of its 2526 trading days (26% of its 
sample observations), 540 of which fall within the post-outbreak period, it is evident 
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that the presence of a lagged premium encourages the appearance of feedback 
trading26. Conditioning feedback trading upon the change in the lagged percentage 
price deviation, we find that the South Korean ETF exhibits significant feedback 
trading both for the full sample period and the post crisis’ outbreak period for various 
positive change levels (>0; ≥ 0.5%, 2%), with its sign again switching from positive 
(>0; ≥ 0.5%) to negative (≥2%) as this change grows more positive. These results 
are consistent with those we obtained using the levels of lagged percentage price 
deviations (a positive change in the lagged percentage price deviation essentially 
implies either an increase in the premium or a decrease in the discount), pointing 
towards a relationship between premiums and feedback trading for this ETF. This is 
perhaps not surprising as many profitable trading strategies can be designed to time 
an investment in the ETF markets by observing the deviations of ETF price from its 
NAV over time (Jares and Lavin, 2004).
The Indian ETF exhibits significant negative feedback trading for higher lagged 
premium-levels both for the full sample period (≥ 0.75% and 1%) and pre crisis’ 
outbreak (≥ 0.5%, 0.75% and 1%) which correspond to around 13% of its total 
sample observations (it trades at a premium equal to or greater than 0.5% for 357 
out of its 2695 sample trading days). Conditioning feedback trading upon the change 
in the lagged percentage price deviation, we find that the Indian ETF exhibits 
significant negative feedback trading post crisis’ outbreak only for large positive 
(≥2%) and negative (≤ -2%) change levels, each corresponding essentially to a small 
number of observations (43 days in total; see table 1, panel C). The Brazilian ETF 
exhibits significant negative feedback trading when its lagged percentage price 
deviation is ≥1% pre crisis’ outbreak (corresponding to 72 days, around 3.5% of its 
total sample observations), while the South African ETF generates significant 
positive feedback trading pre crisis’ outbreak when its lagged percentage price 
deviation is ≥0.75% and 1% which correspond to around 5.3% of its total sample 
observations (it trades at a premium pre-outbreak equal to or greater than 0.75% for 
157 out of its 3907 sample trading days).
                                                            
26 As mentioned above, this ETF generates significant negative feedback trading when its lagged percentage 
price deviation is ≤-1% post crisis’ outbreak and this constitutes our sole evidence of significant feedback trading 
being linked to lagged discounts in this paper; however, such deep-discount observations are only evident for 
eleven trading days during that period. 
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Overall, the evidence presented in this paper denotes three things. First of all, we 
have shown that emerging market ETFs accommodate significant feedback trading, 
whose significance emerges once controlling for its interaction with the ETFs’ 
observed premiums and discounts. This demonstrates that feedback trading in ETFs 
entails complex dynamics and should not be viewed as a behavioural pattern simply 
based on past returns. Secondly, supporting Hypothesis 2, we have shown that 
lagged premiums lead to significant feedback trading in our four emerging market 
ETFs, with this significance becoming more widespread among them as the 
observed lagged premium grows in magnitude. This is an interesting finding reported 
for the first time in the literature and implies that feedback traders become active 
when the ETF trades “expensively”, i.e. its price exceeds its net asset value. It is 
possible that feedback traders in this case are linked to the sell-side (e.g. because 
they consider the ETF overpriced), though one should not rule out the possibility that 
the presence of premiums leads them to buy the ETF in anticipation of the premium 
widening. Thirdly, in line with Hypothesis 3, it is important to note that the effect of 
lagged premiums over feedback trading appears to be period-specific (after the 
crisis’ outbreak for the South Korean ETF; before the outbreak for the rest three 
ETFs), suggesting that crisis-periods bear an effect over the behaviour of ETF-
investors which should be accounted for27.
Conclusion 
The present paper examines whether ETFs’ percentage price deviations from their
NAVs (i.e. their premiums and discounts) motivate feedback trading in emerging 
markets’ ETFs. Using a sample of the first-ever broad-index ETFs launched in four 
such markets (Brazil; India; South Africa; South Korea), we show that feedback 
trading is indeed related to these deviations, exhibiting significance near-exclusively 
in the presence of lagged premiums (i.e. when the ETF’s closing price was in excess 
of its NAV the previous day) of various sizes, with the significance of feedback 
trading growing more widespread across our sample’s ETFs as the lagged premium
increases in magnitude. These findings are interesting since they indicate that 
                                                            
27 Whether the results are due to the crisis or the distribution of premiums in the four ETFs is an open issue. As 
mentioned above, 540 out of 660 premium observations of the South Korean ETF fall in the period following the 
crisis’ outbreak. Conversely, the distribution of premiums in the other three ETFs is more balanced between the 
two periods (Brazil: 151 out of 311 premium-observations fall post-outbreak; India: 451 out of 1108 premium-
observations fall post-outbreak; South Africa: 487 out of 1176 premium-observations fall post-outbreak). 
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feedback trading in ETFs entails complexities in its nature and does not necessarily 
rely on historical returns alone. The presence of this relationship is affected by the 
period chosen, with the bulk of feedback trading significance being detected post 
crisis’ outbreak for the South Korean ETF and pre-outbreak for the other three ETFs. 
Taken together, the above results are of particular interest to those investors 
targeting emerging markets’ ETFs, as these help improve their understanding of the 
trading dynamics; specifically for those investors practicing feedback-style rules 
(such as technical analysis) on these ETFs, our results denote that the price-NAV 
deviation can be used as an input to inform their trading.
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics
BRAZIL (PIBB) INDIA (NIFTYBEES) SOUTH AFRICA (SATRIX40) SOUTH KOREA (KOSEF200)
Panel A: Statistical properties of the return-series
μ 0.0580 0.0624 0.0505 0.0481
σ 1.9846 1.5954 0.0268 1.6260
S -0.1619*** -0.3913*** -0.0390 -0.2272***
E(K) 6.9269*** 7.0252*** 2.3906*** 8.4439***
Jarque-Bera 4151.4729*** 5608.7565*** 716.5810*** 7526.0628***
LB(10) 33.562*** 26.254*** 25.138*** 17.944*
LB2 (10) 1465.823*** 736.489*** 1432.066*** 642.962***
Panel B: Properties of percentage price deviations
Average % price deviation -0.87% -0.11% -0.09% -0.25%
# days with a premium 311 1108 1176 660
# days with a discount 1762 1587 1814 1866
Average premium 0.43% 0.42% 0.35% 0.24%
Average discount -1.11% -0.48% -0.38% -0.42%
# days when premium >0.25% 163 638 534 162
# days when premium >0.5% 78 357 249 65
# days when premium >0.75% 51 121 121 36
# days when premium >1% 34 54 71 21
# days when discount < -0.25% 1575 1099 974 944
# days when discount < -0.5% 1334 678 464 516
# days when discount < -0.75% 1072 317 201 314
# days when discount < -1% 826 99 83 190
Panel C: Properties of daily changes in percentage price deviations
# days when change >0.5% 419 444 451 254
# days when change >1% 158 122 126 85
# days when change >2% 30 19 23 11
# days when change < -0.5% 436 420 435 234
# days when change < -1% 155 137 134 78
# days when change < -2% 22 24 20 14
*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level, * denotes significance at the 10 percent level; μ = mean, σ = standard deviation, S = skewness, E(K) = 
excess kurtosis, LB(10), LB2 (10) = the Ljung- Box  test-statistics for returns and squared returns for 10 lags. 
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Table 2 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadwhani (1992) Model: ETF Daily Returns
Conditional Mean Equation:   ttttt rr   12102   
Conditional Variance Specification: 2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S 
Parameters BRAZIL (PIBB) INDIA (NIFTYBEES) SOUTH AFRICA (SATRIX40)
SOUTH KOREA 
(KOSEF200)
α
-0.0216
(0.7005)
0.1012
(0.0114)
-0.0177
(0.6116)
0.0681
(0.1021)
θ
0.0275
(0.1276)
-0.0115
(0.5698)
0.0381
(0.0460)
-0.0012
(0.9510)
0

-0.0550
(0.0681)
0.0126
(0.6304)
0.0002
(0.9929)
-0.0074
(0.7945)
1
0.0006
(0.8829)
0.0030
(0.5740)
-0.0030
(0.7122)
-0.0066
(0.2384)
ω
0.1155
(0.0000)
0.0604
(0.0000)
0.0392
(0.0000)
0.0646
(0.0000)
β
0.0136
(0.1545)
0.0652
(0.0000)
0.0060
(0.3252)
0.0363
(0.0000)
λ
0.8968
(0.0000)
0.8674
(0.00000
0.9157
(0.0000)
0.8736
(0.0000)
δ
0.1006
(0.0000)
0.0873
(0.0000)
0.1110
(0.0000)
0.1250
(0.0000)
(β +δ)/ β 8.3970 2.3389 19.50 4.4435
Half-life 17.2884 28.8371 30.0532 24.7658
Parentheses include the p-values. 
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Table 3 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadwhani (1992) Model: The effect over feedback trading when the ETF exhibits
a lagged discount
Conditional Mean Equation:    
ttttttttt rrr DD    121.11,0120.10,02 )1(   
Conditional Variance Specification: 2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S 
Parameters BRAZIL (PIBB) INDIA (NIFTYBEES) SOUTH AFRICA (SATRIX40) SOUTH KOREA (KOSEF200)
α
-0.0222
(0.6970)
0.1001
(0.0129)
-0.0227
(0.5199)
0.0676
(0.1025)
θ
0.0284
(0.1239)
-0.0126
(0.5386)
0.0414
(0.0335)
-0.0002
(0.9914)
φ0,0
-0.0415
(0.2096)
0.0458
(0.2659)
0.0153
(0.6735)
-0.0154
(0.7047)
φ0.1
-0.1272
(0.1052)
-0.0292
(0.4288)
-0.0184
(0.6977)
-0.0091
(0.8378)
φ1,0
0.0015
(0.7374)
0.0010
(0.9309)
-0.0136
(0.2213)
-0.0000
(0.9999)
φ1,1
-0.0039
(0.7219)
0.0056
(0.3500)
0.0125
(0.4605)
-0.0120
(0.0213)
ω
0.1182
(0.0000)
0.0625
(0.0000)
0.0401
(0.0000)
0.0643
(0.0000)
β
0.0119
(0.2245)
0.0637
(0.0000)
0.0054
(0.3622)
0.0371
(0.0000)
λ
0.8958
(0.0000)
0.8650
(0.0000)
0.9153
(0.0000)
0.8741
(0.0000)
δ
0.1041
(0.0000)
0.0934
(0.0000)
0.1118
(0.0000)
0.1227
(0.0000)
φ0,0= φ0,1
0.9970
(0.3180)
1.7660
(0.1839)
0.3180
(0.5728)
0.0111
(0.9161)
φ1,0= φ1,1
0.2098
(0.6470)
0.1337
(0.7146)
1.7187
(0.1899)
0.9075
(0.3408)
(β +δ)/ β 9.7478 2.8816 21.7037 4.3072
Half-life 16.8721 27.8287 29.2737 24.9030
Parentheses include the p-values. φ0,0= φ0,1 and φ1,0= φ1,1 hypotheses-estimates are generated by Wald’s test.
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Table 4 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadwhani (1992) Model: The effect over feedback trading of various lagged 
premium/discount levels
Conditional Mean Equation:    
ttttttttt rrr DD    121.11,0120.10,02 )1(   
Conditional Variance Specification: 2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S 
Parameters BRAZIL (PIBB) INDIA (NIFTYBEES) SOUTH AFRICA (SATRIX40) SOUTH KOREA (KOSEF200)
φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1
PDt-1 ≥ +0.25%
-0.0010
(0.9340)
0.0016
(0.7144)
0.0442
(0.8334)
0.0087
(0.1671)
-0.0014
(0.890)
0.7433
(0.3886)
0.0065
(0.7712)
-0.0052
(0.6119)
0.2258
(0.6347)
-0.333
(0.0000)
0.0028
(0.7536)
8.9904
(0.0027)
PD t-1 ≥ +0.5%
0.0045
(0.7279)
0.0012
(0.7823)
0.058
(0.8090)
0.0103
(0.1246)
0.0000
(0.9971)
0.9059
(0.3412)
0.0056
(0.8274)
-0.0036
(0.7197)
0.1112
(0.7387)
0.0464
(0.0146)
0.0038
(0.6224)
5.3409
(0.0208)
PD t-1 ≥ +0.75%
0.0096
(0.5350)
0.0004
(0.9204)
0.3319
(0.5646)
0.0140
(0.0485)
0.0011
(0.8883)
1.5312
(0.2159)
-0.0043
(0.8889)
-0.00115
(0.8800)
0.0077
(0.9299)
0.0409
(0.3013)
0.0031
(0.6802)
0.9404
(0.3322)
PD t-1 ≥ +1%
0.0135
(0.4151)
0.0003
(0.9471)
0.6067
(0.4360)
0.0161
(0.0230)
0.0010
(0.8929)
2.2324
(0.1351)
0.0019
(0.9553)
-0.0025
(0.7967)
0.0151
(0.9021)
0.0393
(0.0000)
0.0037
(0.5508)
14.2027
(0.0002)
PD t-1 ≤ -0.25%
-0.0001
(0.9891)
0.0032
(0.7409)
0.0917
(0.7621)
0.0023
(0.8732)
0.0041
(0.4766)
0.0137
(0.9068)
-0.0035
(0.7996)
-0.0015
(0.9033)
0.0113
(0.9150)
-0.0004
(0.9764)
-0.0072
(0.2330)
0.1887
(0.6640)
PD t-1 ≤ -0.5%
-0.0002
(0.9615)
0.0025
(0.7925)
0.0648
(0.7990)
0.0016
(0.9194)
0.0033
(0.5544)
0.0115
(0.9145)
-0.0077
(0.7213)
0.0028
(0.7869)
0.1936
(0.6599)
-0.0165
(0.6584)
-0.0054
(0.3565)
0.0857
(0.7698)
PD t-1 ≤ -0.75%
0.0008
(0.8638)
-0.0005
(0.9552)
0.0168
(0.8970)
0.0058
(0.7960)
0.0021
(0.6992)
0.0252
(0.8740)
0.0011
(0.9694)
0.0010
(0.9230)
0.0001
(0.9954)
-0.0032
(0.9452)
-0.0065
(0.2520)
0.0049
(0.9442)
PD t-1 ≤ -1%
-0.0003
(0.9579)
0.0029
(0.7301)
0.1034
(0.7478)
0.0127
(0.6980)
0.0022
(0.6874)
0.1004
(0.7513)
0.0103
(0.8135)
0.0001
(0.9884)
0.0514
(0.8206)
-0.0195
(0.7205)
-0.0064
(0.2636)
0.0570
(0.8113)
PD t-1 stands for the percentage deviation of the ETF’s closing price of the previous day from its net asset value of that day. Parentheses include the p-values. φ1,0= φ1,1 
hypothesis-estimates are generated by Wald’s test.
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Table 5 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadwhani (1992) Model: The effect over feedback trading of various lagged 
premium/discount levels before and after the crisis’ outbreak
Conditional Mean Equation:     ttttttttt rrr DD    121.11,0120.10,02 )1(   
Conditional Variance Specification: 2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S 
Parameters BRAZIL (PIBB) INDIA (NIFTYBEES) SOUTH AFRICA (SATRIX40) SOUTH KOREA (KOSEF200)
φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1
Panel A: Pre crisis-outbreak
PDt-1 < 0
0.005
(0.904)
0.066
(0.597)
0.221
(0.638)
0.003
(0.893)
0.002
(0.806)
0.001
(0.973)
-0.039
(0.139)
0.014
(0.704)
1.310
(0.252)
-0.010
(0.725)
0.018
(0.548)
0.478
(0.489)
PDt-1 ≥ +0.25%
-0.0508
(0.5018)
0.0055
(0.8479)
0.5109
(0.4747)
0.0113
(0.0981)
-0.0052
(0.6762)
1.4729
(0.2249)
0.0229
(0.5893)
-0.0348
(0.0993)
1.4791
(0.2239)
-0.0104
(0.8332)
-0.0017
(0.9447)
0.0263
(0.8711)
PD t-1 ≥ +0.5%
0.0013
(0.9900)
-0.0017
(0.9456)
0.0008
(0.9772)
0.0204
(0.0017)
-0.0048
(0.6874)
3.8325
(0.0503)
0.0098
(0.8365)
-0.0297
(0.1535)
0.5903
(0.4423)
0.0079
(0.8936)
-0.0009
(0.9680)
0.0202
(0.8869)
PD t-1 ≥ +0.75%
-0.0787
(0.7323)
0.0009
(0.9745)
0.1179
(0.7314)
0.0268
(0.0000)
-0.0030
(0.7865)
5.9834
(0.0144)
-0.1166
(0.0892)
-0.0205
(0.2985)
1.8541
(0.1733)
0.0295
(0.7108)
-0.0039
(0.8623)
0.1698
(0.6803)
PD t-1 ≥ +1%
0.8255
(0.0438)
-0.0070
(0.7907)
4.0427
(0.0444)
0.0318
(0.0000)
-0.0027
(0.8023)
8.2348
(0.0041)
-0.1193
(0.0799)
-0.0206
(0.2956)
1.9939
(0.1579)
-0.0046
(0.9774)
-0.0001
(0.9949)
0.0007
(0.9783)
PD t-1 ≤ -0.25%
0.0019
(0.9475)
-0.0286
(0.9475)
0.3211
(0.5709)
-0.0031
(0.8630)
0.0037
(0.5882)
0.1289
(0.7196)
-0.0360
(0.1664)
-0.0165
(0.5057)
0.3158
(0.5741)
-0.0196
(0.6049)
0.0059
(0.8190)
0.3047
(0.5810)
PD t-1 ≤ -0.5%
0.0067
(0.8337)
-0.0168
(0.6782)
0.2309
(0.6308)
-0.0032
(0.8700)
0.0016
(0.8178)
0.0556
(0.8137)
-0.0089
(0.7727)
-0.0291
(0.2189)
0.2885
(0.5912)
-0.0217
(0.6222)
0.0020
(0.9327)
0.2217
(0.6378)
PD t-1 ≤ -0.75%
-0.0060
(0.8609)
-0.0040
(0.9033)
0.0021
(0.9634)
-0.0151
(0.6968)
0.0018
(0.7940)
0.1837
(0.6682)
0.0088
(0.8257)
-0.0271
(0.2231)
0.6281
(0.4281)
-0.0078
(0.8892)
-0.0041
(0.8590)
0.0038
(0.9509)
PD t-1 ≤ -1%
-0.0258
(0.4635)
0.0063
(0.8349)
0.5383
(0.4631)
-0.0535
(0.7036)
0.0009
(0.8936)
0.1489
(0.6996)
-0.0139
(0.7957)
-0.0201
(0.3246)
0.0119
(0.9132)
-0.0311
(0.6298)
0.0009
(0.9696)
0.2182
(0.6404)
Panel B: Post crisis-outbreak
PDt-1 < 0
0.002
(0.579)
-0.003
(0.805)
0.193
(0.660)
-0.005
(0.722)
0.011
(0.270)
0.857
(0.355)
-0.002
(0.860)
0.014
(0.453)
0.568
(0.451)
0.002
(0.857)
-0.012
(0.020)
1.216
(0.270)
PDt-1 ≥ +0.25%
0.0036
(0.7664)
0.0031
(0.4852)
0.0014
(0.9703)
0.0138
(0.3046)
-0.0016
(0.9187)
0.5581
(0.4550)
0.0088
(0.7342)
0.0046
(0.6993)
0.0214
(0.8837)
0.0324
(0.0535)
0.0108
(0.2233)
1.4153
(0.2342)
PD t-1 ≥ +0.5%
0.0064
(0.6261)
0.0029
(0.5040)
0.0638
(0.8006)
0.0138
(0.3608)
0.0035
(0.7826)
0.2744
(0.6004)
0.0278
(0.3859)
0.0041
(0.7308)
0.4893
(0.4842)
0.0337
(0.0000)
0.0065
(0.2701)
12.0162
(0.0005)
PD t-1 ≥ +0.75%
0.0108
(0.5054)
0.0020
(0.6361)
0.2787
(0.5976)
0.0204
(0.5672)
0.0050
(0.6449)
0.1689
(0.6811)
0.0596
(0.2276)
0.0043
(0.7038)
1.2187
(0.2696)
0.0318
(0.0000)
0.0058
(0.3685)
10.9401
(0.0009)
PD t-1 ≥ +1%
0.0123
(0.4575)
0.0021
(0.6255)
0.3634
(0.5466)
0.0062
(0.8565)
0.0057
(0.4105)
0.0003
(0.9870)
0.0739
(0.2590)
0.0037
(0.7444)
1.1489
(0.2838)
0.0323
(0.0000)
0.0056
(0.3236)
11.0893
(0.0009)
PD t-1 ≤ -0.25%
0.0012
(0.7851)
0.0066
(0.5192)
0.2256
(0.6348)
0.0032
(0.8800)
0.0105
(0.3472)
0.0935
(0.7598)
0.0170
(0.3007)
0.0044
(0.7597)
0.3529
(0.5525)
0.0060
(0.7091)
-0.0060
(0.3427)
0.4754
(0.4905)
PD t-1 ≤ -0.5%
0.0016
(0.7304)
0.0045
(0.6520)
0.0676
(0.7949)
-0.0024
(0.9188)
0.0104
(0.3316)
0.2461
(0.6198)
0.0140
(0.6546)
0.0127
(0.3060)
0.0015
(0.9692)
-0.0132
(0.1524)
-0.0044
(0.2626)
1.0603
(0.3032)
PD t-1 ≤ -0.75%
0.0025
(0.6059)
0.0020
(0.8357)
0.0020
(0.9639)
0.0151
(0.6779)
0.0056
(0.5734)
0.0632
(0.8015)
0.0487
(0.3278)
0.0098
(0.4005)
0.5894
(0.4427)
-0.0317
(0.8249)
-0.0046
(0.4478)
0.0353
(0.8509)
PD t-1 ≤ -1%
0.0020
(0.6814)
0.0042
(0.6411)
0.0420
(0.8377)
0.0451
(0.0930)
0.0060
(0.3621)
1.9385
(0.1638)
0.1050
(0.1638)
0.0071
(0.5262)
1.6803
(0.1949)
0.1186
(0.0072)
-0.0048
(0.2694)
7.1238
(0.0076)
PD t-1 stands for the percentage deviation of the ETF’s closing price of the previous day from its net asset value of that day. Parentheses include the p-values. φ1,0= φ1,1 
hypothesis-estimates are generated by Wald’s test.
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Table 6 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadwhani (1992) Model: The effect over feedback trading of various changes in 
ETFs’ lagged percentage price deviations
Conditional Mean Equation:     ttttttttt rrr DD    121.11,0120.10,02 )1(   
Conditional Variance Specification: 2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S 
Parameters BRAZIL (PIBB) INDIA (NIFTYBEES) SOUTH AFRICA (SATRIX40) SOUTH KOREA (KOSEF200)
φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1
ΔPDt-1 ≥ 0
0.0053
(0.4923)
-0.0035
(0.5291)
0.7669
(0.3812)
-0.0005
(0.9460)
0.0046
(0.54420)
0.2291
(0.6322)
-0.0008
(0.9481)
-0.0051
(0.6874)
0.0581
(0.8095)
-0.0160
(0.0040)
-0.0003
(0.9798)
1.4230
(0.2329)
ΔPD t-1 ≥ +0.5%
0.0066
(0.4475)
-0.0028
(0.5968)
0.7685
(0.3807)
0.0120
(0.5060)
0.0009
(0.8799)
0.3411
(0.5592)
0.0066
(0.7056)
-0.0045
(0.6879)
0.2877
(0.5917)
-0.0128
(0.0451)
-0.0031
(0.7077)
0.8165
(0.3662)
ΔPD t-1 ≥ +1%
0.0094
(0.3923)
-0.0004
(0.9397)
0.6394
(0.4239)
0.0088
(0.6208)
0.0028
(0.6174)
0.1037
(0.7475)
0.0155
(0.5811)
-0.0023
(0.8154)
0.3547
(0.5514)
0.0024
(0.8419)
-0.0012
(0.8591)
0.0704
(0.7907)
ΔPD t-1 ≥ +2%
0.0231
(0.3270)
0.0006
(0.8856)
0.9229
(0.3367)
0.0228
(0.3865)
0.0034
(0.5245)
0.5139
(0.4735)
0.0180
(0.6326)
-0.0026
(0.7900)
0.2821
(0.5953)
0.0674
(0.0000)
0.0023
(0.6464)
65.7202
(0.0000)
ΔPD t-1 ≤ -0.5%
-0.0032
(0.5949)
0.0055
(0.4380)
0.7733
(0.3792)
0.0073
(0.4764)
0.0012
(0.8445)
0.2635
(0.6077)
0.0074
(0.7012)
-0.0032
(0.7644)
0.2372
(0.6263)
0.0005
(0.9724)
-0.0098
(0.1595)
0.3765
(0.5395)
ΔPD t-1 ≤ -1%
0.0038
(0.6029)
0.0005
(0.9325)
0.1289
(0.7195)
0.0203
(0.1486)
0.0020
(0.7275)
1.5539
(0.2126)
0.0059
(0.7993)
-0.0010
(0.9232)
0.0778
(0.7803)
0.0015
(0.6916)
-0.0083
(0.1472)
2.0780
(0.1494)
ΔPD t-1 ≤ -2%
0.0028
(0.8022)
0.0000
(0.9933)
0.0500
(0.8231)
0.121
(0.6422)
0.0029
(0.5932)
0.1211
(0.7278)
-0.0479
(0.4569)
0.0007
(0.9417)
0.5529
(0.4572)
-0.0005
(0.9309)
-0.0076
(0.2376)
0.6967
(0.4039)
ΔPD t-1 stands for the day-to-day change in the percentage deviation of the ETF’s closing price of the previous day from its net asset value of that day. Parentheses include the 
p-values. φ1,0= φ1,1 hypothesis-estimates are generated by Wald’s test.
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Table 7 - Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Sentana and Wadwhani (1992) Model: The effect over feedback trading of various changes in
ETFs’ lagged percentage price deviations before and after the crisis’ outbreak
Conditional Mean Equation:     ttttttttt rrr DD    121.11,0120.10,02 )1(   
Conditional Variance Specification: 2
11
2
1
2
1
2
  ttttt S 
Parameters BRAZIL (PIBB) INDIA (NIFTYBEES) SOUTH AFRICA (SATRIX40) SOUTH KOREA (KOSEF200)
φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1 φ1,0 φ1,1 φ1,0= φ1,1
Panel A: Pre crisis-outbreak
ΔPDt-1 ≥ 0
-0.0297
(0.4624)
0.0077
(0.8153)
0.5202
(0.4704)
-0.0162
(0.4267)
0.0087
(0.3787)
1.2735
(0.2591)
-0.0306
(0.2883)
-0.0188
(0.4402)
0.1045
(0.7465)
0.0018
(0.9482)
-0.0141
(0.6684)
0.1387
(0.7096)
ΔPD t-1 ≥ +0.5%
-0.0538
(0.3271)
0.0093
(0.7601)
1.0116
(0.3145)
0.0023
(0.9334)
-0.0011
(0.8687)
0.0150
(0.9026)
-0.0230
(0.6295)
-0.0254
(0.2249)
0.0021
(0.9637)
-0.0001
(0.9991)
-0.0063
(0.7999)
0.0187
(0.8912)
ΔPD t-1 ≥ +1%
-0.0705
(0.5666)
0.0017
(0.9528)
0.3209
(0.5711)
-0.0287
(0.4766)
0.0019
(0.7817)
0.5613
(0.4537)
-0.0105
(0.8747)
-0.0208
(0.2987)
0.0213
(0.8841)
0.0186
(0.7247)
-0.0075
(0.7469)
0.2160
(0.6421)
ΔPD t-1 ≥ +2%
0.2500
(0.7083)
-0.0113
(0.6501)
0.1526
(0.6961)
0.0040
(0.9510)
0.0030
(0.6482)
0.0003
(0.9872)
-0.0722
(0.3361)
-0.0180
(0.3615)
0.4864
(0.4855)
0.0727
(0.7901)
-0.0015
(0.9478)
0.0738
(0.7859)
ΔPD t-1 ≤ -0.5%
0.0037
(0.9339)
-0.0035
(0.9095)
0.0178
(0.8938)
0.0112
(0.3954)
-0.0081
(0.4025)
1.5155
(0.2183)
0.0021
(0.9488)
-0.0304
(0.1941)
0.6555
(0.4181)
0.0056
(0.9051)
-0.0073
(0.7577)
0.0609
(0.8051)
ΔPD t-1 ≤ -1%
0.0057
(0.9168)
0.0012
(0.9649)
0.0057
(0.9399)
0.0170
(0.2979)
-0.0021
(0.7745)
1.2780
(0.2583)
-0.0258
(0.6041)
-0.0189
(0.3551)
0.0168
(0.8967)
0.0055
(0.9477)
-0.0036
(0.8694)
0.0111
(0.9159)
ΔPD t-1 ≤ -2%
0.3270
(0.2985)
-0.0074
(0.7595)
1.1241
(0.2890)
0.0231
(0.6081)
-0.0015
(0.8294)
0.2941
(0.5876)
-0.0396
(0.7081)
-0.0171
(0.3908)
0.0434
(0.8349)
-0.0972
(0.2655)
-0.0018
(0.9122)
1.1834
(0.2767)
Panel B: Post crisis-outbreak
ΔPDt-1 ≥ 0
0.0079
(0.3232)
-0.0023
(0.6798)
0.9904
(0.3196)
0.0225
(0.1374)
-0.0110
(0.4110)
2.6754
(0.1019)
0.0121
(0.4404)
-0.0016
(0.9175)
0.4223
(0.5158)
-0.0153
(0.0060)
0.0011
(0.9230)
1.4554
(0.2277)
ΔPD t-1 ≥ +0.5%
0.0107
(0.2486)
-0.0017
(0.7496)
1.2338
(0.2667)
0.0272
(0.3945)
0.0020
(0.8428)
0.5797
(0.4464)
0.0131
(0.5179)
0.0026
(0.8470)
0.1947
(0.6590)
-0.0480
(0.0019)
0.0008
(0.9314)
8.3743
(0.0038)
ΔPD t-1 ≥ +1%
0.0108
(0.3288)
0.0012
(0.7955)
0.6254
(0.4291)
0.0247
(0.6306)
0.0040
(0.6905)
0.1587
(0.6903)
0.0200
(0.5368)
0.0044
(0.7122)
0.2068
(0.6493)
0.0279
(0.3090)
0.0071
(0.3434)
0.6341
(0.4258)
ΔPD t-1 ≥ +2%
0.0174
(0.5382)
0.0024
(0.5659)
0.2841
(0.5941)
0.1613
(0.0000)
0.0055
(0.4431)
341.9678
(0.0000)
0.0269
(0.6539)
0.0029
(0.7953)
0.1552
(0.6936)
0.1350
(0.0019)
0.0043
(0.3186)
8.9894
(0.0027)
ΔPD t-1 ≤ -0.5%
-0.0026
(0.6605)
0.0076
(0.2897)
1.0526
(0.3049)
-0.0186
(0.3717)
0.0128
(0.2866)
1.6049
(0.2052)
-0.0011
(0.9613)
0.0082
(0.5041)
0.1411
(0.7072)
0.0039
(0.8132)
-0.0073
(0.1834)
0.3843
(0.5353)
ΔPD t-1 ≤ -1%
0.0018
(0.8128)
0.0024
(0.2312)
0.0042
(0.9486)
0.0100
(0.7168)
0.0087
(0.4049)
0.0019
(0.9657)
0.0028
(0.6019)
0.0069
(0.5570)
0.0232
(0.8789)
0.0015
(0.8232)
-0.0060
(0.2348)
1.2625
(0.2612)
ΔPD t-1 ≤ -2%
-0.0024
(0.8541)
0.0023
(0.6334)
0.1114
(0.7385)
-0.0942
(0.0027)
0.0106
(0.1604)
9.5080
(0.0020)
-0.0127
(0.9113)
0.0070
(0.5381)
0.0294
(0.8639)
0.0010
(0.8682)
-0.0058
(0.3210)
0.7290
(0.3932)
ΔPD t-1 stands for the day-to-day change in the percentage deviation of the ETF’s closing price of the previous day from its net asset value of that day. Parentheses include the 
p-values. φ1,0= φ1,1 hypothesis-estimates are generated by Wald’s test.
